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PATENT DEMANDS & STARTUP COMPANIES:
THE VIEW FROM THE VENTURE CAPITAL COMMUNITY

Robin Feldman*
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236 (2014)
ABSTRACT

With the high level of interest in patent monetization and its effects
on US companies, data on the topic is increasingly important. This study
examines one aspect of the topic, focusing on the effects of the risingpatent
monetization market on startup companies. The study provides one of the
rare glimpses of monetization activity outside of lawsuits. It provides both
quantitative and qualitative information on the startup community's
experience with andperspectives on patent demands. Among other issues,
the study tests a narrative that has circulated suggesting that patent
monetization creates for venture capital investment. According to the
theory, venture capitalists will be attractedto the possibility of monetizing a
startup company's patents if the company fails, and this attraction spurs
investment. The study tests that narrative through the eyes of the venturebacked community itself
Results include the following: When making funding decisions, the
vast majority of venture capitalistsdo not consider the potentialfor selling
to assertionentities if the companyfails. Thus, patent monetization does not
appear to provide investment incentives. In addition, both the companies
and the venture capitalists overwhelming believe that patent demands are
having a negative impact on the startup community, and all or most of the
demands they experience are coming from those whose core activity
involves licensing or litigatingpatents. The effects of these demands are
described in terms including the specific costs expended by the companies
and the distraction to management, engineers, and other employees. Most
important,participantsdetail the human toll that patent demands have had
on entrepreneurs.
* Professor of Law, Harry & Lillian Hastings Chair and Director of the Institute for
Innovation Law at the University of California Hastings College of the Law. This work
was supported by the University of California Hastings Institute for Innovation Law. No
corporation or other entity outside of UC Hastings provides more than 10% of the
Institute's funding. The National Venture Capital Association has provided no funding for
this or any other work conducted by the author. I am grateful to Colleen Chien, Jennifer
Dowling, Ira Ehrenpreis, Osagie Obasagie, Carolyn Spencer, and Kelly Stone for their
suggestions on the design of the study. I also wish to thank Sara Jeruss, David Schwartz
and Michael Risch for their comments on the results, as well as Alice Armitage, Kristy
Brady, Jake Wexler, and Josh Wolf for their invaluable research assistance.

16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236 (2014)
I.

2013-2014

O VERVIEW OF THE STUDY .....................................................................
A. Backgroundon Modern PatentMonetization................................
B . K ey Study R esults ...........................................................................
C. Choosing Terms and Points ofMeasurement." A Politically
ChargedE ndeavor.........................................................................
D. BriefHistory and Overview of Startup Financing.........................
E. Design of Study and Participants...................................................
F. Study L im itations............................................................................
G. GeneralCharacteristicsofRespondents........................................

237
238
242

244
254
258
259
261
II. RE SUL T S ............................................................................................... 2 6 3
A. The Extent of PatentDemands Against Venture-Backed
263
Comp anies......................................................................................
266
B. Source and Timing ofDemands .....................................................
C. Significance and Cost of Impact ofPatentDemands on
268
Venture-Backed Startups................................................................
D. The Human Factor:Respondents Elaborateon the Impact of
272
P atent D emands .............................................................................
272
1. ExtraordinaryImpacts .............................................................
2. Distractionsto Management andEngineers............................ 273
273
3. Cost Imp act ..............................................................................
274
4. The H um an F ace ......................................................................
5. O ther Assorted Impacts............................................................
275
275
6. Weak Claims; Wasteful Process..............................................
E. Is PatentAssertion Helpful or Harmfulfor the
276
Venture-Backed Community? ........................................................
28 1
III. C ON CL U SION .........................................................................................

I.

OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

This article presents the results of a study conducted on the topic of
patent demands against venture-backed startups. The study was conducted
through the members of the National Venture Capital Association and their
portfolio companies. 1 The article details responses from more than 200
venture capitalists and their portfolio companies. Results include

1This study was conducted by a law professor and was supported by the professor's
academic institute. See author's note.
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quantitative information on the frequency of patent demands,2 the
percentage of demands that came from those whose core business involves
licensing or litigation patents, the costs of responding to demands, the
possibility of demands timed in relation to funding, and the distribution of
demands in different industry sectors.
Results also include the respondent's views on whether patent
demands are a significant problem in the sector, whether venture capitalists
consider the possibility of selling patents in determining whether to invest
in a company, and whether venture capitalists would be deterred by patent
demands against a company they were considering adding to their portfolio.
Finally, the article provides qualitative information on the effects of patent
demands on the lives of venture-backed startup companies-documenting
both the human and the economic costs of patent demands.
A. Background on Modern Patent Monetization
Patent monetization has existed in some form since at least the 19th
century. In recent years, however, the market for patent trading and patent
assertion has expanded dramatically, growing both in scope and in the level
of sophistication. As a result, the percentage of patent lawsuits filed by
those who do not make products has increased dramatically from roughly
25% in 2007 to almost 60% in 2012. 3 In other words, as of 2012 the
majority of patent lawsuits are filed by those whose core business involves

licensing and litigating patents as opposed to making products.
Before the rise of the today's patent assertion market, most patent
litigation operated more as a tool of last resort which was primarily used by

companies that created their own products against other companies that also
created products. In this context, the threat of litigation ensured a form of
mutually assured destruction. For example, if one product company
launched its patents against a competitor, the target company would wield
its own set of patents in retaliation, putting the original company's products
at risk. The tendency toward risk aversion, acted as a limiting factor on
patent demands and patent lawsuits.

2For purposes

of this study, "patent demands" include letters indicating that the recipient
may be infringing a patent and demanding a license fee, threats of litigation, or lawsuits.
3See Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of

PatentMonetization Entities, 18 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2013); see also Colleen V. Chien,
Patent Assertion Entities, Presentation to the DOJ/FTC Hearing on PAEs (Dec.10, 2012)
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2187314 (using data from RPX
Corporation and concluding that the percentage of litigation by non-practicing entities in
2012 has reached 62%).
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In today's patent assertion market, however, entities that do not
make products use litigation as a profit-generating weapon, often relying on
a product company's fear of the high costs and risks of patent litigation to
encourage settlements. The complexity and uncertainty of the patent
system tends to work in favor of those who do not make products. For
example, it is tremendously difficult to know what the language of a patent
covers, and it can cost as much as $6 million to find out through a patent
lawsuit. When a patent holder brandishes numerous patents at once, this
cost and complexity can multiply. Moreover, if a product company
challenges the patent and loses, the company could face enormous damages
and litigation costs, as well as the possibility that its product could be shut
down entirely. A rational company, therefore, may choose the less
expensive option of settlement-still a bitter pill to swallow, but one that
tastes far better than the costs and risks of litigation.
The cumulative impact of patent assertion in its various forms is
staggering. Although difficult to measure with any accuracy, scholars have
estimated that patent assertion by monetizers cost U.S. companies $29
billion in 2011 alone. 4 These estimates suggest that only 20% of that cost
flows back to innovation, either to outside inventors or to any internal
research and development by monetizers.5
Other scholars have considered different aspects of patent assertion
and monetization. Professor Brian Love has determined that non-practicing
entities (one of many terms for those who do not make products) file more
than twice as many lawsuits per patent as product companies and sue more
than four times as many alleged infringers per patent.6 Others have found
evidence that patent monetization lawsuits are directed most frequently at
companies in the Internet and technology sectors. In particular, Professors
Allison, Tiller, Zyontz, and Bligh have examined internet-related patents
and non-internet-related patents, concluding that the internet-related patents
have been litigated 7.5 to 9.5 times more frequently than patents not related
to the Internet.7 Professor David Schwartz has noted that costs differ
between plaintiffs and defendants in certain types of patent lawsuits, which
he attributes to the fact that non-practicing entities can keep costs low by
having few documents to discover, moving to trial sparingly, and avoiding
4See

James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costsfrom NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
5See id.
6Brian J. Love, An EmpiricialStudy of PatentLitigation Timing: CouldA PatentTerm
Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators? (Santa Clara Univ. School of
Law, Working Paper No. 1917709, 2011-12).
7John R. Allison et al., Patent Litigation and the Internet, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6
(2012).
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bringing motions in court. 8 Professor Michael Risch studied the 10 most
litigious non-practicing entities and concluded that most of the patents
asserted in the sample originated from product companies. 9 Others have
looked at "sport of kings" patent suits, involving companies with more than
$100 million in revenue, and still others have examined patent suits
between smaller entities. 10
Of particular interest, Professor Colleen Chien has recently studied
startups and patenting, including interviews with patent litigators, largecompany patent attorneys, venture capitalist, and startups.11 Although the
work has focused particularly on experiences with non-practicing entities,
Chien also examined views on obtaining patents and interactions with larger
product companies. Her conclusions include that only 5% of startups in the
sample had sold patents to non-practicing entities, that small companies are
vulnerable targets when-because of a lack of leverage-they pay nuisance
settlements regardless of the merits, that small companies are often targets
of patent suits because they are users of technology, and that costs are
highest for startups when the primary response involves fighting in court.12
Where aspects of Chien's examination can be compared to the work of this
study, the results will be described below.
The problem of patent monetization also has attracted increasing
attention from the press and companies in many sectors. Technology
companies have led the way, with active lobbying campaigns in the United
States as well as in Europe. 3 This is not surprising, given that modern
patent trolling has had perhaps the largest impact on technology-heavy
"David Schwartz, The Rise of ContingentFee Representationin Patent Litigation, 64 ALA.
L. REV. 335 (2012).
9 See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012). The list was

provided by PatentFreedom, which identifies itself as offering subscriptions and services to
help operating companies and law firms manage NPE risk more effectively. See
https:llwww.google.com/search?q PatentFreedom&aq f&oq pat&aqs chrome.0.59j57j
6013j6].1323&sourceid chrome&ie UTF-8.
10See Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, Report from the New America
Foundation's Open Technology Institute, http://ssm.com/abstract=2146251 (citing
GWENDOLYN BALL & JAY KESAN, TRANSACTION COSTS AND TROLLS: INDIVIDUAL
INVENTORS, SMALL FIRMS AND ENTREPRENEURS IN PATENT LITIGATION 13 (2009); Colleen

V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths,and Kings: Narrativesand Evidence in the
Litigation ofHigh-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571 (2009)).

11 Different aspects of Chien's work on patents and startups are available in two locations:
Chien, PatentAssertion Entities, supra note 3, and Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls,

supra note 10.
12 See id.

13 Letter from adidas. AG, et al. to Preparatory Committee, Unified Patent Court, Member

States of the European Union (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/26trolls-letter.pdf.
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industries such as software, smartphones, and computers. Others have
joined the chorus of complaints, including coffee shops, hotels, and retail
outlets large and small. Furthermore, the research below suggests that
patent monetization is beginning to expand beyond the tech industry,
entering the life sciences arena. In short, patent monetization is a complex
and troubling problem that is reaching into a variety of sectors, although the
primary impact continues to be felt in technology.
In response, legislators and regulators at both the state and federal
level have begin exploring solutions to the problem. A variety of bills have
been introduced in Congress, including an extensive reform bill introduced
by Congressman Goodlatte, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.
The bill was passed by the House of Representatives in December of
2013.14 Furthermore, a bill empowering the Federal Trade Commission to
combat aggressive patent assertion was introduced in the Senate by
Senators McCaskill and Rockefeller. 15 The Federal Trade Commission
itself, which held a joint workshop on patent monetization with the
Department of Justice in December of 2012, voted in the fall of 2013 to
initiate a broad-ranging economic investigation into 25 patent assertion
entities.16 In addition, the White House issued a report on patent assertion
in the summer of 2013, along with a series of executive orders. 17 In
response to those orders, as well as workshops held on the topic, the Patent
and Trademark Office has begun exploring sunshine rules for disclosure of
patent ownership. State legislators and attorneys general have joined in,
taking actions against monetizers who have targeted companies in their
jurisdiction.18 Even the Supreme Court has agreed to hear several cases
peripherally related to the topic. 19
14

Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013) (a bipartisan bill aimed at combating

abusive patent litigation).
15 Transparency in Assertion of Patents Act, S. 2049, 113th Cong. (2014) (aimed at curbing
unfair and deceptive practices arising in connection with the assertion of patents).
16

See FTC, Agency Information Collection Activities; ProposedCollection; Comment

Request, 78 FR 61,352 (Oct. 3, 2013),
http:/ www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2013 101310 03agencyinfofrn.pdf
17 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION

AND U.S.

INNOVATION (June 2013),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent report.pdf.
"' In February of 2014, forty-two attorneys general signed a letter to Congress supporting
federal patent reform legislation. Many states have also begun creating causes of action
against patent trolls under state law. Vermont has been one of the leaders in this area: the
Vermont state legislature passed a bill, Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringements, H.B.
299, to be codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-4199 (2013). In addition, the
Vermont Attorney General filed a complaint against MPHJ Technology, alleging that
MPHJ engaged in unfair and deceptive practices when it sent letters threatening patent
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With the high level of interest in patent monetization and its effects
on US companies, data on the topic is increasingly important. This study is
intended to examine a small corner of the question and to test narratives
about startups and the rising patent monetization market. With this goal in
mind, the study examines patent demands against startup companies
through the experiences of venture capitalists and their portfolio companies.
In particular, the study tests a narrative that has circulated suggesting that
patent monetization creates incentives for venture capital investment. 20 The
study tests this narrative through the eyes of the venture-backed community
itself, and examines the community's general experiences with and
perspectives on patent demands in general.
B. Key Study Results
Key results of the study are the following:
*

70% of the venture capitalists have portfolio companies that
have received patent demands, and roughly one in three
startup companies report receiving patent demands.

*

Although 70% of the venture capitalists have experienced
demands in the information technology sector, 30% also
have experienced demands in the life science sector.

*

The vast majority of patent demands against the startup
companies come from entities that license or litigate patents
as their core activity. (Specifically, 59%

of the venture

litigation to small businesses and non-profits in the state. The Oregon Senate passed S.B.
1540 (Feb. 19, 2014) (making patent trolling a violation of the state's Unlawful Trade
Practices Act). In Wisconsin, the legislature passed S.B. 498 (Mar. 21, 2014) (making it a
crime to send patent-licensing demand letters that contain false or misleading information).
In New York, the state Attorney General entered into a settlement with MPHJ (restricting
the patent assertions activities within the state of New York).
19 Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App'x 57 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
cert. grantedsub nom Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 49
(2013); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
cert. granted 134 S. Ct. 48 (2013); CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed.
Cir. 2013), cert. granted 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013).

See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC, Opening Remarks, Competition Law & Patent
Assertion Entities: What Antitrust Enforcers Can Do, (June 20, 2013) (suggesting, in a list
of positive attributes of patent assertion entities, that such entities, "can make it easier for a
failed start-up to monetize its patents, providing some insurance for venture capitalists"),
availableat http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ramirez/130620paespeech.pdf.
20
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capitalists and 66% of the startup companies reported that all
or most demands come from such entities.)
*

74%

of the venture capitalists and 58%

of the startup

companies report that patent demands had a significant
impact on a company. (Details of those impacts and
associated costs are described below);
*

According to the vast majority of both the venture capitalists
and the startup companies, the costs of preparing for and
defending against patent demands exceed $50,000 per
company, with a number of companies reporting costs in the
millions of dollars.

*

64% of venture capitalists disagree with the statement, "as a
venture capitalist, I consider the potential for selling patents
to patent assertion entities if the companies fail."

* When asked whether they see patent assertion as positive for
startups and the startup community, 72% of venture
capitalists disagree.
*

100% of venture capitalists indicate that if a company had an
existing patent demand against it, they might refrain from
investing. Roughly half indicate that it would be a major
deterrent on its face, and the other half indicate that they
might refrain, depending on the circumstances.

Finally, to paraphrase one venture capitalist who summed up the
impact of patent demands on venture-backed companies in a particularly
cogent fashion: When companies spend money protecting their intellectual
property position, they are not expanding; and when companies spend time
thinking about patent demands, they are not inventing. 2

211

21The venture capitalist's direct quotation from the study comments is the following:

"More spend [sic] to protect IP position, not necessarily expand. Thinking about trolls
asserting not about inventing."
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C. Choosing Terms and Points of Measurement: A Politically
Charged Endeavor
An initial question in any survey involves the terms to use and the
issues to be measured. As concerns have escalated over the problem of
patent trolling, everyone has scrambled to define terms. In this highly
charged atmosphere, no one wants to be branded a bad guy, and if patent
trolls are bad guys, everyone wants the definition to point somewhere else.
And, indeed, numerous definitions-and variations of those definitionshave been offered to define the notion of patent trolling. As a result,
seemingly arcane disagreements over the terms of measurement can have a
significant effect on the legislative and regulatory rules chosen to address
inappropriate use of patents, as well as the business models that develop in
anticipation of or in response to those legal regimes. Words matter, and
never more so than in the current political climate. Thus, the following
section will describe the different terms and definitions that have been
suggested by various scholars, commentators, and market actors and
explore the theoretical bases for each. The section will also explain the
parameters chosen for this study and the logic behind those choices.
In discussing the topic of patent assertion, many have used the term
non-practicing entity, or NPE, to describe entities that do not use the patents
they own to create anything. In the code-like language of patents, using the
ideas in the patent to create a product is called "practicing the patent," and
thus, those who do not create products are called "non-practicing." Among
many others, Congress used the term NPE in directing the non-partisan
General Accounting Office to study patent assertion. 22
Problems with the term NPE include the question of whether to
incorporate universities in the definition. Universities are in the business of
scientific research and education, and they generally do not engage in the
production of products from their inventions. Thus, they do not actually
practice the ideas in their patent portfolios. Universities, however,
traditionally do not engage in extensive patent litigation, filing only onehalf of one percent of all patent lawsuits in a recent four-year period, for
example.2 3 Thus, they do not appear to engage in the same types of behavior
as other entities that do not practice their patents.

See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 34 (2011) (directing the
nonpartisan General Accounting Office to study the effects of non-practicing entities on
U.S. patent litigation); see also 157 CONG. REC. S5441 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement
of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
23See Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 3, at 41.
22
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In addition to issues related to universities, the term non-practicing
"entity" could be interpreted to include only those who are organized in a
particular manner-a limitation that could be problematic. Some of the
most famous modern examples of those whose core activity is patent
assertion are individuals,
rather than entities.24 Other prolific monetizers are
25
organized as trusts.
The distinction between "entities" and "non-entities" has led to
confusion, particularly with the GAO report on patent assertion. In
measuring lawsuits filed by what it termed "patent assertion entities," the
report noted a significant, but smaller, increase in lawsuits from such
entities than was noted by other studies. Much of the difference between the
studies can be attributed to the GAO methodology, which included in its
numbers only those organized as corporations or partnerships but not those
organized as trusts or operating as individuals.26 This led to some odd
results. For example, the greatest number of lawsuits filed in the GAO's
own 500 case sample was filed by someone organized as a trust. 27 A wellknown name in patent assertion circles, the business activity of this trust is
licensing and litigating patents. Nevertheless, the GAO excluded this trust
from the count of patent assertion entities, as well as excluding other trusts
and individuals engaged in the same activity.
The reverse definitional problem occurred early on when some
researchers defined patent trolls only as individuals. In particular, one of
the earliest data-based analyses of modem patent trolling looked only at
individual inventors. 2 8 Focusing only on the individuals, however, ,misses
much of the activity.
From a definitional standpoint, it should not matter whether one
chooses to organize oneself as a corporation, a partnership, a trust, or
simply to act as an individual. It is the activity that matters. 29 Thus, in
24 See, e.g., David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to CorporateAmerica, N.Y. TIMES

(July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/has-patent-will-sue-an-alertto-corporate-america.html (profiling Erich Spangenberg).
25 See Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects
ofPatent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DuKE L & TECH. REv. 357, 382
(2012) (analyzing the data that the authors provided to the GAO).
26 See United States Government Accountability Office Report, Intellectual
Property:
Assessing Factors That Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve Patent
Quality, at 17 n.35 (August 2013) (noting the exclusion of individuals and trusts and the
resulting variation from the Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 3).
27 See id.
28 See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, PATENT FAILURE 16 (2008).
29 One could argue that certain organizational formations facilitate so-called
trolling
behavior more smoothly, for example, by limiting the targets ability to respond. We see
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studying the venture-backed community, I used a definition that included all
whose core business activity involves licensing or litigating patents as
opposed to making products. The definition, therefore, includes not just
those organized as a corporation or partnership but also those organized as
trusts or operating as individuals.
The GAO's term, "patent assertion entity," raises other difficulties
as well. The term patent assertion entity, or PAE, focuses on entities whose
primary activity is to purchase patents to make licensing demands against
others who make products-in other words, to "assert" their patents. The
Federal Trade Commission in particular has used the term PAE. 30 The
term, however, is subject to additional confusion. For example, does the
notion of an "assertion entity" include only those who file lawsuits or does
it also encompass those who assert by making licensing demands short of
filing a lawsuit? Some entities have tried to suggest that those who assert
only through licensing demands should be excluded from the term "patent
assertion entity." For example, the patent aggregator RPX buys patents,
grants licenses to those who purchase the rights to their portfolios, but
reserves the right to transfer those patents to others-subject to the licenses.
In other words, those who might buy the patents could sue anyone other
than companies who have already purchased a license from RPX. Although
the buyer's patents may file infringement lawsuits, RPX does not file any
lawsuits itself
In press interviews, RPX officials have noted that they have sold
patent rights only infrequently, and have explained the rational for those
sales. For example, they describe using the practice to drive reluctant parties
to join the RPX network and avoid free rider costs. 31 In addition, RPX
this as more central to issues related to the effectiveness of the behavior, rather than as a
reason
to alter the definition.
3
' FTC, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice And Remedies
With
Competition 8 at n.5 (2011),
www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf [hereinafterEvolving IP
Marketplace] (defining PAE as having a business model focused on "purchasing and
asserting patents against manufacturers already using the technology, rather than
developing and transferring the technology"); see also Ramirez, supra note 20.
31A Fortune Magazine feature story on RPX reported on RPX's sales to other NPEs. The
story quotes John Amster, CEO of RPX:
The practice is used in part, Amster admits, to drive prospects into the
network that otherwise feel no need, because RPX, at the behest of their
competitors, has already purchased the portfolios that most threaten their
industry sector. Such prospects sometimes claim to see no value in the
portfolios RPX has already purchased. "We all them back a few months
later," Amster says, "and say, 'Look. We put it up for sale. There's an
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purchases patents from NPEs that have already filed lawsuits, buying a
license for existing RPX clients and an option for the remaining defendants.
RPX then approaches the remaining defendants, offering to buy them out of
the lawsuit in exchange for joining RPX.32
Distinguishing between those who assert by licensing demands and
lawsuits as opposed to those who assert only by licensing demands would
be problematic. From a practical perspective, much of the patent assertion
activity occurs outside of litigation, and studies estimate that 90% of
demands for a patent license never proceed all the way to a lawsuit,
presumably because either the target agrees to pay a fee or the demand is
dropped 3 All of these demands, however, occur in the shadow of a
potential lawsuit 4 A license, after all, is merely an agreement not to sue in
return for a monetary payment, and the threat of a lawsuit is what drives
companies to pay the licensing fee. Thus, in examining patent assertion
behavior it makes little sense to look only at assertions that progress all the
way to the particular moment of filing a lawsuit, rather than the other
assertions that take place in the shadow of that filing.
From an economic perspective as well, there may be very little
difference between those who file lawsuits and those who do not-at least if
those who do not file lawsuits are willing to transfer patents to others who
will file suit or to purchase patents out of existing lawsuits. Imagine an
entity that chastely refuses to file any lawsuits, but sells its patents to or
buys its patents from hypothetical nasty third parties, who do sue. The price
of the patent when it is sold reflects the expected value of the lawsuit. Thus,
NPE who's willing to pay us for it." And sometimes they say, 'You're no
different than they are' [likening RPX to the trolls.] And we say, 'Hey,
wait a minute. Back up. We bought this on behalf of our clients. You told
us there was no value to it. The market has spoken, and there is value.
Somebody is going to sue you. We didn't call them and tell them to sue
you. We said, 'Here's an asset. It's for sale.' If you don't think it's a risk,
then fine."
Roger Parloff, Taking on the Trolls, FORTUNE (March 17, 2014).
32 See id.
33 See Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 3, at 32. The study notes that the 2013 White
House Report on Patent Assertion cites conservative estimates of the number of patent
threats in 2012 at 60,000 with the actual number more likely over 100,000. Comparing
even the more conservative number of patent demands with the roughly 5,000 lawsuits
filed in 2012, one can conclude that more than 90% of patent demands do not reach the
courthouse door.
34 The concept of bargaining in the shadow of the law is introduced and explored in the
seminal article, Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargainingin the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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the chaste entity receives the economic benefit of that lawsuit, even without
having to file the suit itself. Moreover, the chaste entity's licensing activity
benefits from the possibility of sale to those who will sue. In other words,
target companies are encouraged to buy licenses from the chaste entity for
fear that they will have to face a lawsuit from the nasty third party who
might buy the patent. The threat, implicit or explicit, is that if one does not
join the club, one will be left out in the cold as the only target available for
the nasty third party to sue.35 The same is true when the chaste entity
purchases patents out of already existing lawsuits. The chaste entity may be
able to provide benefit from economies of scale or repeat experience, but
once again, it benefits from a system in which patent lawsuits are filed and
from the economic pressure of the costs and risks of the litigation, even
though it does not file lawsuits directly itself. In short, a distinction
between those whose assertion profile includes lawsuits and those whose
assertion profile does not makes little sense practically or economically.
The FTC avoids this problem, defining patent assertion entities to
include those who assert by licensing demands as well as those who assert
by lawsuits, but the agency adds its own variation on the theme. The FTC
defines patent assertion entity to include only those who purchase and
assert patents, the implication being that one who originally obtained the
patent would be excluded. 6 In other words, those who obtain patents and
assert them are not included in the definition of patent assertion entities. In
particular, the definition would exclude entities in the semi-conductor
industry-such as Qualcomm and Rambus-that spend large sums
researching and designing products. 7 Companies such as these may create
prototypes to license others to produce but do not actually manufacture the
product themselves. These entities have argued fervently that they should
not be considered part of any definition of patent troll.
Some Congressional proposals contain a variant of this approach.
They would exempt those who have expended significant resources in
attempting to work the patent from provisions related to curbing patent
assertion abuse.

35 For

an allegation that entities like RPX make this threat explicit, see Tom Ewing &
Robin Feldman, The GiantsAmong Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (citing letter to
the FBI from Kaspersky Labs). In press interviews, RPX notes that it has sold rights only
infrequently.
36 See id.
37 See Daniel Culley et al., Learningfrom Rambus-How to tame those troublesome trolls,
57 ANTITRUST BULL. 117 (2012) (using both Rambus and Qualcomm as examples of

corporations that invent and produce patented products and subsequently take steps to
monetize the patents they've obtained).
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This definitional issue is perhaps the most challenging, and it
deserves considerable exploration. To the extent that society is concerned
about those who assert patents as a business practice without contributing to
the creation of products for society, the semi-conductor companies have a
point. Engaging in significant research and development that leads to the
creation of a viable product should be considered a productive activity, even
if the company chooses to hire others to do the actual manufacturing.
Economists generally would frown on a rule that preferences vertical
integration-in other words, they would reject a rule providing incentives
for one company to engage in all the levels of production necessary for a
final product.
Nevertheless, defining patent assertion entities as only those who
buy and assert patents risks omitting a significant amount of activity that
could look much like the remainder of what falls within the definition. In
addition, the more limited definition implies that original patent holders
should be omitted from the legislative and regulatory reform proposals that
may be developed to address modern concerns about the inappropriate use
of patents. This, in turn, suggests that original patent holders are unlikely to
create the types of problems that are fueling current patent trolling
concerns.
The logic behind such a conclusion is questionable, however, when
one considers the following. The patent system has operated for some time
with a high percentage of rights that are never actualized.3 8 These shadow
rights have remained largely on the periphery of the patent system, creating
no direct returns for the patent holder. In fact, studies suggest that more than
90% of patents never create a direct return for the patent holder. 9
Many of these patents may be of questionable value. The Patent &
Trademark Office lacks the resources to examine the massive number of
patent applications that come through its doors-not with the level of
scrutiny required to eliminate weak patents, or weak claims within a patent.
For example, one scholar has estimated that patent examiners spend no
more than 18 hours on any patent application, and this time is likely to be

3 1 have described the issue of shadow rights, and problems with monetization of those

rights, in greater detail. See Robin Feldman, IntellectualProperty Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 247, 261-63 (2013). That discussion is summarized here.
39 Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, PatentPortfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REv.
66

(2005) (noting that estimates suggest that less than 5 percent of patents hold any value).
See also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the PatentSystem, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 267 (1977).
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spread over two to three years. With patent applications containing dozens
or even hundreds of claims, the available time is simply insufficient.
It is not just the patent as a whole that may be weak. Even if some
claims within the patent have merit, others may be of questionable validity.
Patent drafters frequently write a range of claims, including very
aggressive, broadly reaching claims down to much more narrow and
specific ones.41 Patent examiners may cull out some of the overbroad and
weaker ones, but with the limited time available to review each patent,
examiners are not likely to catch all weak claims. Nevertheless, each
individual claim can be launched on its own against a target company.
The system may have worked reasonably well when fewer patents
were operationalized. Rather than concentrating resources up front, the legal
system could focus its energy on the few patents that became valuable
enough to make it to litigation. 42 In a system of intense monetization,
however, every patent, and every claim within each patent, has the potential
to be launched against product manufacturers to garner a return. Thus, the
fact that the patent being asserted was written by the patent holder is no
guarantee that it is better than any other patent.
Moreover, exempting those who have originated the patent could
have the effect of merely altering how the patent assertion business is
organized. For example, rather than purchasing a patent from the original
patent holder, the monetizer could simply join forces with the original
inventor, either using the patent holder as a front for the monetization
activities or simply funding monetization efforts by the patent holder in
exchange for a healthy share of the returns. In that manner, the monetizer
has now escaped the definition of "one who purchases and asserts patents"
simply by not purchasing. The market has already developed complicated
schemes in which product companies or aggregators fund the monetization
activities of others, along these lines.
40

Mark A. Lemley, RationalIgnorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500

(2001).
41 See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 40-74 (2012) (describing how modem

patents operate).

42 See id.; see also Christian

Bessy & Eric Brousseau, Technology Licensing Contracts:

Featuresand Diversity, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 451, 459 (1998); Eric Brousseau &
Christian Bessy, Public and PrivateInstitutions in the Governance of IntellectualProperty

Rights, in INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY RIGHTS: INNOVATION, GOVERNANCE, AND THE
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 251 (Birgitte Andersen, ed., 2006); Dan L. Burk & Mark

Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003); F. Scott Kieff, The
Casefor RegisteringPatents and the Law and Economics of PresentPatent-Obtaining
Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003); Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)Certainty,Legal
Process,and Patent Law, 42 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1109 (2010).
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In addition, monetizers and aggregators could simply choose to get
into the business of filing for patents. Thus, if we choose to define patent
assertion entities to exclude those who file for patents, we could be
inadvertently incentivizing the creation of an industry of applying for
patents for the purpose of monetizing them, rather than for the purpose of
creating products for society.
There is an even more subtle issue, however, involved in exempting
the original patent holder from the definition of monetization. As a society,
we have a romantic attachment to the notion of the inventor, which spills
over into a romanticized image of those who hold patents. I have described
this romanticized image in the following manner:
In the classic story of invention, a great thinker toils to create
a wonderful innovation, files for a patent to protect what he
or she has contributed to the store of human knowledge, and
then produces a new product that enters the market,
improving the lives of all citizens. In a variation on this
theme, the valiant inventor, deeply immersed in the pursuit
of innovation, lacks the capital, experience or interest to
commercialize the invention. The inventor then simply
licenses the patent to a third party, who brings forth the
product for the betterment of society. Copyright tells a
similar tale that features brilliant writers hunched over
coffeehouse tables, or dedicated computer programmers
toiling late into the night, accompanied only by caffeine and
their dreams. 43
It is a lovely story, and one that undoubtedly exists to some extent,
but much of the modem patent world looks nothing like this.
In particular, most people assume that a patented invention can
create a product. This assumption could not be farther from the truth. Most
products require a multitude of intellectual property in order to create a
viable product. Such intellectual property may include numerous patents, as
well as trade secrets and those wonderfully named components, "know
how" and "show how." Even if the knowledge captured in the patent can be
translated successfully into a product, that product must be developed
further into a form that is stable and can be mass produced and distributed,
which requires additional intellectual property, knowledge, and skill. The
gap between a patented idea and a viable product is known colloquially as
43 Robin

Feldman, IntellectualProperty Wrongs, 18 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 250 (2013);
Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2012).
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the "valley of death," a valley that only a few hardy souls are able to cross.
Thus, most patent holders who try to develop a product are destined to
become failed entrepreneurs.
Psychology research suggests that we often assess items as having
greater value when they belong to us than when they belong to someone
else.44 In addition, anyone who has ever represented a client can attest that
clients generally believe their claim is right, a perspective that cannot
possibly be accurate for all sides at all times. Such selective reasoning can
be explained by the coherence effect, a psychological phenomenon under
which people who examine a heterogeneous set of facts are likely to make
inferences that are shaped by their own biases and preferred conclusions.45
Even if people begin their reasoning processes by looking for facts that
support both sides of an argument, the underlying tendency toward biased
reasoning can lead to a variety of subconsciously selective behaviors.4 6
This includes framing one's research inquiries in a way that only pulls in
favorable evidence (a selective framing strategy) and choosing only the
evidence that is likely to support a particular hypothesis (selective
4,7
exposure).
One might anticipate that these types of distortions would be
enhanced by those who are not repeat players and who have less experience
in the arcane world of patent law, a description likely to apply to many
individual inventors. Our fascination with the romanticized individual
inventor could inadvertently fuel a cottage industry. Failed entrepreneurs,
which most entrepreneurs are likely to be, would be encouraged to turn to
patent assertion as a second career-a career that would provide a handy
outlet for frustration over the inability to get a product off the ground. With
monetizers willing to join forces and fund these efforts behind the scenes, if
we exempt original patent holders from the definition of monetizers, we
may simply shift the current modes of monetization-with all of their

44 See, e.g., Ziv Carmon & Dan Ariely, Focusingon the Foregone:How Value Can Appear
So
Different To Buyers And Sellers, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 360 (2000).
45
DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS, 34-35

(2012).
46 Id. at 36-37.
47 Id. at 37. See also id. at 38. (Selective scrutiny[:] ... [R]esearch demonstrates that

people tend to scrutinize information that is incompatible with their conclusion, but apply
lax standards when assessing the validity of compatible information .... Biased
evaluation[:] ... [T]he most ubiquitous form of biased reasoning occurs through a distorted
evaluation of evidence ....

Selective stopping[:] ... [A] limited body of research suggests

that people tend to shut down inquiries after having found a sufficient amount of evidence
to support their leading hypothesis.) (Citations omitted).

16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236 (2014)

2013-2014

problems-into a different form. Rather than curbing abuses, the result
could be the same monetization with a different face.
Exempting original patent holders may reflect concerns about
problems that small players face in the patent system, and small players are
certainly at a disadvantage in the expensive and complex world of patents.
Some small companies and individual inventors have complained that large
companies are less than diligent, to put it mildly, in responding to
complaints that rights are being trampled. Rights, of course, are useless if
one cannot enforce them, a concept that is as critical for intellectual
property as for any other set of rights. The system must be designed to
avoid indifference to intellectual property rights, as well as to deter outright
theft.
Nevertheless, exempting the original patent holder from the
definition of patent assertion entities could have significant limitations. The
fact that the one asserting the patent also filed for the patent, or spent
resources trying to commercialize it, is no guarantee that the patent is
valuable or that it is being launched at an appropriate target. The infamous
and controversial inventor Jerome Lemelson illustrates the problem.
According to press reports, the Lemelson Foundation and its barcode related
patents received close to $1.5 billion in settlements over a 14-year period in
the 1990s and early 2000S. 48 These patents were invalidated by the courts in
2005.
In light of the issues described above, we should be wary of creating
definitional boundaries that will have the effect of suggesting that original
patent holders should be exempted from measures to curb monetization
abuses, and we certainly should be wary of measurements that exclude
original patent holders from the categories to be examined. Thus, I have
chosen to include both those who file for patents and assert them as well as
those who purchase patents and assert them in the definition for this study.
In short, in choosing the terms and definitions for this article, I have
opted for simple and broad terms, avoiding the fine distinctions that are
increasingly appearing in the discourse. For example, rather than nonpracticing entities or patent assertion entities, I use the term monetizers. It
has the advantage of not distinguishing among actors based on the form
they choose, and of referencing individuals as well as "entities." I define
monetizers as those whose core business involves licensing and litigating
patents, rather than making products. This definition has the virtue of
simplicity, and allows one to speak broadly about the phenomenon. I must

48 See Roger Parloff, Taking on the Trolls, FORTUNE (Mar. 17, 2014).
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reiterate, however, that the topic is complicated, and that in a politically
charged atmosphere, every word is at issue.
One also must decide what activity to measure, in addition to
choosing the definition of those involved in the activity. As described
above, prior work has explored monetization in the context of activity after
the patent holder files a lawsuit. There are excellent practical reasons for
focusing on lawsuits. Activity before that time generally is shrouded in
nondisclosure agreements and difficult to access through public documents.
This study, however, was intended to look at the effects of a range of patent
activity. Thus, in framing the questions in the survey, I chose the term
"patent demands" and defined the term broadly to include demand letters,
threats of litigation, or lawsuits. Specifically, respondents were asked
whether they had "received patent demands, for example, demand letters,
threats of litigation, or infringement lawsuits."
D. BriefHistory and Overview of Startup Financing
Although today's technology startups have created the enduring
image of the scrappy, underfinanced underdog that goes on to create the
next Facebook from someone's garage, technology startups used to require
massive investments to get off the ground. 49 Early venture capital-backed
technology companies required sizable investments in manufacturing,
engineering, personnel, and professional services in order to enter the
market. 50 As a result, early tech companies like Digital Equipment
Corporation (DEC) and Tandem had to get their funding from large venture
capital firms such as Arthur Rock and Kleiner Perkins.5 I
Thanks to the success of these prototypical venture-backed
initiatives, the operating model established by these early venture capitalists
has endured to this day.52 Under this model, venture capital firms
"provid[e] capital to high-potential businesses in exchange for partial
ownership of the firm."53 Traditionally, venture capital funding has filled
the crucial gap between early seed funding, such as money from friends and
family, and later rounds of investment.54 As protection for risking large
49 Ben Horowitz, How Angel Investing Is Different Than Venture Capital,BUSINESS
INSIDER (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-angel-investing-is-differentthan-venture-capital-2010-3.
50 Id.

51

Id.

52 Id.

53 Brian L. Dos Santos, Pankaj C. Patel, & Rodney R. D'Souza, Venture CapitalFunding

for Information Technology Businesses, 12 J. ASS'N INFO. SYSTEMS 57, 59 (2011).
54 Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARv. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 131, 132.
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amounts of capital on nascent businesses, venture capitalists take an active
role in managing them, with the expectation that enough of these companies
will become successful to provide sufficient returns on their investments.
By insisting on direct involvement in the operation of a company,
commonly in the form of seats on the company's board, venture capitalists
seek to leverage their significant experience in the relevant industry to
provide new entrepreneurs with seasoned advice. 56 Venture capitalists also
insist on certain downside protections that allow them to protect their
investments in the company if circumstances change.57 For example,
venture capitalists will usually require that their interest in a company be
issued as preferred equity that comes with a liquidation preference, which
allows the venture capitalists to get their money out first if the company is
liquidated. 58 Another common requirement for a venture-backed deal is
anti-dilution protection, which allows the venture capital firm to maintain
its percentage of equity ownership in the event of a subsequent round of
financing by requiring that the venture capital firm gets issued additional
shares to preserve its current equity position at the expense of common
stockholders. 59 Though these requirements can entail significant sacrifices
on the part of founders, the risky nature of investments in their companies
often leaves little choice.
The importance of venture capitalists' willingness to invest in highrisk companies must not be understated. In particular, this willingness
provides an essential lifeline to entrepreneurs, whose businesses usually
cannot access lower-cost capital early on due to their minimal assets.6 °
"Uncertainty is inherent in startup companies because their innovative
' 61
products and business plans are untested at the time of investment.,
Given how difficult it is for a new startup to achieve early success in its
chosen market, if venture capitalists were not tolerant of failure, many
promising startups would otherwise be liquidated after early progress
proved unsatisfactory.62 This risk tolerance does far more than prevent a
venture capitalist's early exit. Research shows that those venture capitalists
that are more tolerant of failure tend to pick more innovative startups to
55

Id.at 133.

56

Id. at 138-39.

5 Id. at 134.
58

Id.

59 Id.

6
1Id.

at 132-33.
6 Abraham J.B. Cable, Fendingfor Themselves: Why SecuritiesRegulations Should
EncourageAngel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 107, 121 (2011).
62 Xuan Tian & Tracy Yue Wang, Tolerancefor Failureand CorporateInnovation,
REV.
OF FIN. STUD. 211 (2014).
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invest in.6 3 In turn, startups supported by such venture capitalists have more
successful initial public offerings and produce greater numbers of patentspatents that tend to have a greater impact on their respective markets.6 4 In
general, venture-backed businesses have a significantly higher rate of
survival than those without venture backing. ,65 It is unsurprising, then, that
in the years since their rise to prominence, venture capital firms have
become "important intermediaries in financial markets, providing capital to
new ventures that might otherwise have difficulty attracting financing., 6 6
Although venture capital firms remain an important part of startup
financing, a lot has changed since the early days of the tech industry, and
the needs of newly-formed startups are now quite different. Modern
startups are far less capital-intensive than they used to be, and now
frequently require less money than the typical minimum venture capital
67
investment.
As a result, there is often what some have called a "funding
gap" between the amount covered by seed funding, which is usually below
$500,000, "and the minimum amounts venture capital funds invest . . .
[which is] typically $5,000,000.,,68 In addition, venture capitalists may ask
for more control than a modern startup can afford in its earliest stages. In
addition, venture capitalists have a lengthy diligence process and can take
up to six months to decide whether they will invest, which may be far too
slow for a startup in dire need of funds. 69 Finally, and quite significantly,
venture capitalists may leverage their equity ownership and board seats to
force a founder out of the company if the venture capitalist determines that
the founder is responsible for poor performance, an aspect that founders
would, understandably, wish to avoidi.
As a result, funding sources outside the traditional venture-backed
system have risen in prominence to meet the changing needs of founders.
One such source is the angel investor, a wealthy individual that funds
promising startups before they are ready for venture capital. 1 Unlike
63

64

Id. at 211.
id.

65 A. L. Zacharakis & G. D. Meyer, Lack of Insight: Do Venture CapitalistsReally

UnderstandTheir Own Decision Process?, 13 J. Bus. VENTURING 57, 57-76 (1998).
66 Dos Santos et al., supra note 53. at 58.
67 Cable, supra note 61, at 108; see also Horowitz, supra note
49.
61 Cable, supra note 61, at 108.
69 Martin Zwilling, Top 10 Sources OfFunding For Start-ups,
FORBES (Feb. 12, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/12/funding-for-startups-entrepreneurs-financezwilling.html; see also Horowitz, supra note 49.
70 See generally Zider, supra note 54, at 136 (noting that VC equity ownership and
deal

structure give VCs the ability to make management changes for companies with mediocre
performances).
71
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venture capitalists, angel investors usually do not insist on control rights
like board seats, leaving founders with the ability to control their company's
direction and strategy for longer.72 Angels are also willing to invest smaller
amounts of money, which helps fill the "funding gap" and allows founders
to raise money from a greater number of sources.73 Combined with the fact
that angels often use their connections to bring other angels on board,
companies can sometimes get by on an initial financing consisting solely of
angel investments.74 Nevertheless, companies backed solely by venture
capitalists do better overall than those with backing from a combination of
venture capitalists and angels or angels alone, in terms of achieving an
initial pubic offering or a merger. Research has shown, however, that
companies with angel-only financings were significantly less likely to fail
than companies receiving venture financing.75
An even more recent development is the rise of startup incubators,
which provide not only financial resources but also strategic planning
assistance and infrastructure like office space and computer equipment, in
exchange for equity. 76 Participants benefit both from this expert guidance,
and also from the ability to network internally with other companies being
supported by the same incubator.77 Furthermore, a fledgling startup can
stick with an incubator from inception straight through its initial public
offering, should it come to pass. In fact, since many incubators focus on
early stage companies, they often sell their interests once the company goes
public, thus focusing more on short-term profit than long-term influence
over the company. 78
Although the process by which potential investors engage with
startups can vary greatly depending on the parties involved, one
increasingly common factor considered by many investors-particularly in
the technology industry-is the strength of a company's intellectual
property position. 79 In today's highly competitive landscape-in which
investors are presented with numerous possible ventures with each seeking
support for a new, unproven technology-a company's intellectual property
72

Id. at 129.

73 See Horowitz, supra note 49.
74 Cable, supra note 61, at 131.
75 Cable, supra note 61, at 129.

76 Meredith M. Brown, Michael P. Harrell, & William D. Regner, InternetIncubators:
How to Invest in the Mew Economy Without Becoming an Investment Company, 56 Bus.
LAW. 273, 273 (2000).
77 Id. at 273-74.
78 Id. at 274.
79 Joseph Hadzima, Bruce Bockmann, & Alexander Butler, IP in early stage commercial
and investment success, INTELLECTUAL ASSET MGMT., Mar.-Apr. 2010, 49.
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situation can make a large difference in determining which companies
ultimately get funded. Research has shown that there is a "marked
correlation between success" as measured by a company achieving its initial
public offering or getting acquired "and a company having developed (or
possessed) intellectual property," a correlation that is "even greater . . .
[when]

companies

.

.

.

have good or strong intellectual property

positions. ' 8° As one venture capitalist has commented, "[it is] impossible to
get financing without a good patent strategy, freedom to operate and good
prospects of patentability.""
Given the importance of venture backing to the startup community,
as well as the advantage of a concentrated body of respondents, this study
examines the viewpoints and experiences of venture capitalists and their
portfolio companies in relation to patent demands. Details of the study are
provided in the design and methodology section below.
E. Design of Study and Participants
The study was conducted in September and October of 2013. Two
surveys were prepared, one for venture capitalists and one for companies
within the portfolios of those venture capitalists. Both surveys were
submitted to the Western Institutional Review Board, which determined that
the research met the exemption criteria for human subjects research under
45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(2). 82 The surveys were prepared for distribution
through the National Venture Capital Association. The survey language was
tested by staff members of the National Venture Capital Association, as
well as by selected board members of the Association who volunteered to
serve as testers.
The National Venture Capital Association distributed both versions
of the survey by email to their member venture capitalists, asking that the
members fill out the venture capital survey themselves and distribute the
company survey to their portfolio companies. Participants were told that
the responses would be anonymous and reported only in the aggregate. The
results were anonymized prior to delivery to the author.
Prior to the survey, the National Venture Capital Association had
not taken a position on patent assertion. In introducing the survey, member
companies were told the following:

8

Id. at49.

81 See Chien, PatentAssertion and Startup Innovation, supra note 12.

See Letter from Western Institutional Review Board dated September 4, 2013 (on file
with author).
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In light of recent patent reform discussions on Capitol Hill,
the NVCA is working with Robin Feldman, Professor and
Director of the Institute for Innovation Law at University of
California Hastings to gather information about the current
environment for patent assertions within the venture-backed
company community. While we have anecdotal information
that patent trolling has become increasingly problematic for
many of our members and their portfolio companies,
particularly in the IT space, we do not have data to quantify
the size and breadth of the issue.
The survey included questions about the respondent's individual
experiences followed by questions about the respondent's overall
impressions. In order to ensure that answers about the respondent's
individual experiences were derived from direct experience to the extent
possible, venture capital respondents were asked to answer the direct
experience questions only for companies "upon whose boards you
personally sit as an investor."
Early in the survey, participants were asked whether they or one of
their companies had ever received patent demands. Those who answered,
"no" were routed directly to the final set of questions related to the
respondent's perceptions of patent demands.
F. Study Limitations
Research through voluntary responses always contains significant
limitations. The results can be skewed by those who choose to respond,
presenting less than a full picture of the experiences of all members of the
group. Similarly, the framing of the question can create a demand problem,
priming those who have experienced the problem to respond. Most
important, the answers represent the respondent's perceptions and cannot be
individually verified. For example, if a respondent notes that the company
has spent $50,000 responding to patent assertions, there are no public
documents or other independent data to verify the figure.
Individual perceptions, however, may be useful for some of the
inquiries in this type of survey. For example, to the extent we are examining
whether the issue of patent demands occupies an entrepreneur's mindshare,
thereby potentially causing distraction, the entrepreneur's own impression
of whether a problem exists can be helpful.
Along the same lines, if legislators and regulators believe they are
responding to the needs of a particular sector of the market, it is useful to
know whether that sector of the market agrees. For example, to the extent
governmental officials believe patent assertion is necessary to attract
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venture capital for startups, it is important to know whether the venture
capitalists have the same perception. Nevertheless, perceptions are no
guarantee of reality for issues such as how widespread a problem may be or
the ways in which it is manifesting itself.
I note in particular that the results may be skewed by the large
percentage of respondents who operate in the information technology
sector. This could reflect a particular interest of those in the information
technology sector in the issue of patent demands, which could, in turn,
suggest that patent demands are a particular problem in that sector, an issue
that will be addressed further below. It could also simply suggest that a
larger portion of venture-backed companies are in the information
technology industry. Nevertheless, it is important to note the prevalence of
responses from that sector.
Looking at both venture capitalists and their portfolio companies not
only provided a broader sample, it also allowed a comparison of whether
the companies themselves agreed with their venture backers about the
extent of the problems, the costs involved, etc. In other words, it provided
some small measure of confirmation.
Research of any kind into patent demand activity is quite difficult.
Although one can study patent demands that proceed to a full-blown
lawsuit, evidence suggests that these are only the tip of the iceberg. For
patent demand activity outside of the courthouse, information is scarce.
Patent interactions are shrouded in nondisclosure agreements. Moreover, for
a number of years, companies have been reluctant to speak to reporters or
researchers, partly out of fear of retaliation by large players with large
patent portfolios. 83 Thus, an anonymized survey, despite its many
limitations, offers a useful vehicle for beginning to understand the issues at
hand.
Finally, in noting limitations, it is important to note that a sample
size of slightly over 200 respondents is small. The experiences and
observations are useful for understanding the venture-backed company
community, and the information is important, in light of the research
obstacles described above. Nevertheless, any observations should be
tempered with the caution appropriate for a grouping of this limited size.
13 See,

e.g. Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, at 4. "[W]e called people who had licensing
arrangements with [a patent aggregator], we called people who were defendants in lawsuits
involving [the aggregator's] patents, we called every single company being sued by [a
monetizing shell company]. No one would talk to us."); see also Alex Blumberg & Laura
Sydell, This American Life: When Patents Attack, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (July 22,
2011), transcript available at
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/07/25/138576167/when-patents-attack.
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G. General Characteristics of Respondents
Respondents were given a choice of choosing information
technology, life sciences, clean energy or other as the sector in which they
operate. Venture capitalists were permitted to mark all categories that apply,
which resulted in a total percentage that exceeds 100%.
Of the venture capitalists that responded, 68% have portfolio
companies operating in the information technology sector. 84 41% of the
venture capitalists have companies operating in the life sciences sector and
19% in the clean energy sector. 10% of the venture capitalists have
companies operating in sectors other than those categories, and respondents
described those sectors as consumer apparel,
oil and gas, retail, new media,
85
industrial technology, and growth equity.
In which sectors do your portfolio companies operate?*

Information Technology

Life Sciences
Clean Technology
Other
0

18

35

53

70

Percentage of VC responses

*Note The percentage of responses exceeds 100%
because respondents could select multiple industries.

The portfolio companies that chose to respond were even more
strongly concentrated in the information technology sector, with 81% of
respondents indicating that they operate in information technology. 6% of
the companies operate in the life sciences and only 1% in clean energy.
12% of the portfolio companies indicated that they operate in other sectors,
which they further described as internet technology, consumer electronics,
84 According to NVCA staff, the dominance of the information technology sector among
respondents is also reflected in the overall membership.
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consumer technology, eCommerce, eCommerce retail, retail, 3D printing,
health information technology, Finance, consumer apparel, and education.
In which sector does your company operate?

*
*
*

Information Technology
Other
Life Sciences
CleanEnergy

Portfolio companies were also asked where their company is
located, and the results mirror common perceptions of startup hubs. The
largest group (32%) was located in California, with most of that in Northern
California. Other groupings were located in Illinois (13%), Massachusetts
(11%), New York (7%), Colorado (7%), Texas (7%), Wisconsin (4%),
Virginia (2%), and Washington (2%). The Appendix contains a list of

respondent locations by state.
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Location of startup company headquarters

* 30%: Northern California
@13%: Illinois
*
*

II.

,I%:
7%:
7%:
?%:
25%:

Massachusetts3:Ilni1%
Colorado
New York
Texas
Other

RESULTS

The article will separate the results into the following sections. The
first section looks at the extent of patent demands against venture-backed
companies, based on the direct experiences of the venture capitalists and
their portfolio companies. This section also considers whether patent
demands are a technology sector problem only. The second section
examines the source of patent demands against venture-backed companies
and the timing of those demands. The third section examines the impact of
patent demands, looking at both the economic impact and the personal toll
on the individuals involved. The fourth section examines the respondents'
perceptions of whether patent assertion is helpful or harmful for the
venture-backed community and how patent demands affect a venture
capitalist's decision whether to fund a company.
A. The Extent of Patent Demands Against Venture-Backed
Companies
Survey responses suggest an extensive amount of patent demand
activity against venture-backed companies. Specifically, the survey asked
venture capitalists whether any of their portfolio companies have received
patent demands. Patent demands were defined broadly, with the question
listing licensing demand letters, threats of litigation, and infringement
lawsuits as examples of patent demands.
7001 of the venture capitalists reported that they have portfolio
companies that have receivedpatent demands.

PATENT DEMANDS & STARTUP COMPANIES

Percentage of venture capitalists whose portfolio companies have
received patent demands*

0 70%: Yes
- 22%: No
5%: D~o not know
I

3%: I do notsit on any company bods

'

.

.

In addition, the venture capitalists were in general agreement that
patent demands are increasing against venture-backed companies. 790%
responded that the number of patent demands have increased over the last
five years for their portfolio companies overall.
Change in the level of demands received by venture capitalists
over the last 5 years

* 79,o: lncrcacd
* 18%: Unchangcd
3%: Decreascd
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The data suggest, however, that the phenomenon is best understood
on an industry wide basis, in other words, looking at the venture-backed
industry as a whole. Not all portfolio companies have received patent
demands. For example, with venture capitalists whose companies have
received patent demands, 60% have seen demands asserted against up to
one-quarter of their portfolio companies, and 35% have seen demands
asserted against between one-quarter and half of their portfolio companies.
Similarly, with the portfolio companies themselves, 31% have received
patent demands. Even the 31% number, however, is striking. It suggests that
roughly one in three venture-backed companies must figure out how to
respond to a patent demand.
On the whole, patent demands continue to dominate in the
information technology sector. Venture Capitalists whose companies had
received patent demands were asked whether they had experienced those
demands in the information technology sector, life sciences, clean energy or
other. Again, to account for broad venture portfolios, venture capitalists
were permitted to mark all categories that applied, with the result that the
total will exceed 100%.
Of the venture capitalists whose companies have received patent
demands, 70% have experienced those demands in the information
technology sector. Patent demands, however, are not limited to the
information technology sector. 300% of the relevant venture capitalists had
received patent demands in the life sciences sector. In addition, 10% have
received patent demands in the clean energy sector, and 5% in other sectors.
Scctors in NN
hich Nenture capitalists hav e experienced patent
demands

Infonuatioa Technology
Life Sciences
Cean Technology
3

Other
18
is

35

53

70
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B. Source and Timing of Demands
The study asked both the venture capitalists and the portfolio
companies if they could identify the type of entities initiating the patent
demands against them. As described in the methodology section above,
respondents were asked whether the patent demands came from entities
whose core activity is licensing and/or litigating patents as opposed to those
whose core activity is not licensing and/or litigating patents.
For 5900 of the venture capitalists, the patent demands came either

all or mostly from those whose core activity is licensing or litigating
patents. Foranother 210% of the venture capitalists,the demands came from
an equal mixture of those whose core activity is licensing and litigating
patents and those whose core activity is not. The question allowed
respondents to answer separately for "all" or "most", although the chart
below groups those responses.
Source of patent demiands experienced by venture
cap%ita sts

15
~ ~nt
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n
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The portfolio companies responded with similar percentages on this
question. For 660% of the portfolio companies, the patent demands came
either all or mostly from those whose core activity is licensing or litigating
patents. For another 11% of the portfolio companies, the demands came
from an equal mixture of those whose core activity is licensing and
litigating patents and those whose core activity is not. These results suggest
that monetizers are initiating most of the patent demand activity against
startups.
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Source of patent demands experienced by companie%
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The study also looked for evidence of whether patent demands were
timed to correspond with funding infusions. Anecdotes have circulated in
the venture-backed community of companies receiving demands
immediately after receiving their first round of funding. The results,
however, did not reveal evidence of widespread patent demands related to
receiving initial funding. Only 11% of portfolio companies reported
receiving patent demands within one year of receiving their first round of
venture funding, and 53%

reported that they received their first patent

demand more than a year after receiving the first round of venture funding.
Moreover, 27% of the portfolio companies received their first patent
demand before receiving any funding at all. Thus, we could find no
systematic evidence of demands timed to coincide with initial rounds of
venture funding. In contrast, in Chien's interviews with venture capitalists,
some noted that demands "seemed to be dictated by an event in the
company's development-publicity/success,
an M&A or funding event, or
86
IPO."
company's
the
Examining the initial round of venture funding cannot completely
answer the question of whether there are patterns of demands timed to
coincide with funding events. It is possible that monetization involves a
variety of approaches, with some monetizers targeting funding events. It is
also possible that monetizers target funding events on the whole, and no
pattern would emerge from looking only at initial funding. Nevertheless, we
86 See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 10, at 11. An initial public offering

(IPO") is the first sale of stock by a private company to the public.
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did not find evidence of a sustained pattern of patent demands against
venture-backed startups following their initial round of funding.
C. Significance and Cost of Impact of Patent Demands on
Venture-Backed Startups
The study also examined the impact of patent demands on venturebacked startups, both from a quantitative and a qualitative perspective.
Venture capitalists were asked whether patent demands had a significant
impact on any of their portfolio companies. Examples of significant impacts
listed in the question included distracting management, expending
resources, or altering business plans.
Only 8% of the venture capitalists reported that the patent demands
had no impact on any of their portfolio companies that received them. In
contrast, 740% of the venture capitalistsreported that patent demands had
either a highly significant or a moderately significant impact on the
companies that received them, including distracting management,
expending resources, or altering business plans. Another 18% of the
venture capitalists reported that patent demands had a mild impact.
11ae patent (1mds
1(

d a signifiat impIt on Any ofrour portfolio

coInpanis fr example. dtistating naitgnueent, V),

di) g resourccs or

atering business plas? (I'ntu capitaits)

@33%: H~giy Signiftcnt 1maN
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With the portfolio companies, 580% reported that patent demands
had either a highly significant or moderately significant impact on their
company, including distracting management, expending resources or
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altering business plans. Another 310% reported that patent demands had a
mild impact. Similar to the venture capitalists, only 9% of the portfolio
companies reported that patent demands had no impact at all.
IlIve patent demands had a significant impact on your
company, for examnple, distracting management, expending
... ures or altering busines phns?
2%

9w

~2 2

It is interesting to note the difference between responses from the
venture capitalists and responses from the companies regarding the extent
of the impact on patent demands. Although roughly 90% of both groups
identified some impact, the venture capitalists rated that impact as highly or
moderately significant far more frequently (74%) than did the companies

themselves (58%). Although it is impossible to know without further
examination, one could hypothesize various possible explanations for the
difference. First, it is possible that the companies are in a better position to
evaluate the true nature of the impact, given their more intimate
involvement with day-to-day operations. Alternatively, the venture
capitalists might be in a better position, given their breadth of their
experience spread out across many companies. The difference could also
reflect the small sample size. It may be that the venture capitalists who
responded had sufficient experience to have encountered greater impact
demand examples, while the companies that choose to respond did not
happen to include ones that had experienced the greater impacts. Finally, it
is also possible that the perception reflects the general "macho" culture of
startup entrepreneurs. In other words, entrepreneurs may be prone to saying,
"no problem, we can handle anything thrown at us," while venture
capitalists may be inclined to temper that interpretation.
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Professor Colleen Chien's study also looked at the impact of patent
demands on startups. Using a more drastic definition of impact, Chien
found that 40% of startups in her study that had received a patent demand
87
from a patent assertion entity reported a "significant operational impact.
Professor Chien defined significant operational impact as "a business
strategy pivot, product change, business/business line exit, delay in hiring or
meeting operational milestone, and/or a reduction in the value of the
company. ' 88 Although the questions differ in both the type of impact
studied and the issue of the source of the relevant patent demands measured,
both studies demonstrate the impact that patents demands are having on
startup companies.
In terms of the cost of dealing with patent demands, the present
survey asked both venture capitalists and portfolio companies to estimate
the average cost to prepare for and defend against patent demands. For the
venture capitalists, the survey asked for an average cost per company. The
questions noted that such costs could include time for company officers and
employees, costs of outside counsel and consultants, or other costs.
57% of the venture capitalists estimated that the average cost per

company to prepare for and defend against patent demands exceeds
$100,000. Another 2 1% estimated that the cost of preparing for and
defending against patent demands totaled between $50,000 and $100,000.
Aven ge cost per company to prepare for or defend against patent
demands asi experienced by (v eture capitalists)

%

It%: $2

V5O$01%

87 See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 10.
88 See id.
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Portfolio companies estimated the costs of preparing for and
defending against patent demands at a lower number. Only 40% of the
portfolio companies estimated that costs of patent demands exceeded
$100,000, in comparison to 57% of the venture capitalists. In addition, 29%
of the portfolio companies estimated the costs at below $25,000, in contrast
to 8% of the venture capitalists who estimated the cost at below $25,000.
The two groups were roughly in agreement with each other for the
percentage of companies that spent between $50,000 and $100,000, as well
as for the percentage of companies that spent between $25,000 and $50,000.
In short, a higher percentage of the venture capitalists reported average
costs within the highest category than did the companies. One could
hypothesize explanations along the same lines as those discussed in the
prior question. In particular, the venture capitalists who responded may
have had sufficient experience to encounter higher cost patent demand
examples, while the companies that choose to respond did not happen to
include ones that had experienced the higher costs.
Approximate cost per company to prepare for or defend
against patent demands as deterined by startup companies.

29%

Professor Chien's survey suggests a higher average cost figure for
defending against patent demands. Again, her study was based on the costs
of defending against patent demands specifically by patent assertion
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entities-similar to what this study describes as monetizers. 89 Depending on
whether the startup chose to settle or fight, the average costs reported in
Chien's survey and interviews ranged from $168,000 to $857,000.90 These
higher figures may reflect the ability of patent assertion entities to impose
higher costs on their targets. 9 I
Finally, the question for the present survey may have been framed
insufficiently to capture the significantly higher cost examples that were
captured in Professor Chien's survey. In particular, the highest cost
category in the present survey was defined as over $100,000, while in the
comments, some respondents noted that their costs had run into the
millions.
D. The Human Factor: Respondents Elaborate on the Impact of
Patent Demands
The most striking results in the study flowed from the venture
capitalists and portfolio companies who took the time to provide details of
the impact of patent demands on their companies. The survey provided
space for respondents to elaborate on the impact of patent demands, and
elaborate they did.
1.

ExtraordinaryImpacts

Some companies and venture capitalists described extraordinary
effects of patent demands on a particular company. One company had to
raise a bridge round to cover costs related to dealing with patent demands.
Another company spent millions of dollars defending against a lawsuit from
"patent trolls," and the company went under due to lack of funding. One
venture capitalist described an "M&A [merger and acquisition] transaction
escrow held up and millions spent in defense of [a] meritless patent suit
from a patent troll." Another described a couple of cases in which the
companies experienced material financial impacts.

" For a description of different terms used in the discussion of patent demands, see supra
notes 22-43 and accompanying text
90 See Chien, Startups and PatentTrolls, supra note 10, at 11.

91 Patent assertion entities may have large portfolios of patents, some of which include
broad claims that are asserted in demand letters sent out by the thousands to small
businesses. The accuracy of the infringement claims made in these letters is often difficult
to assess without large legal expenditures. Many small businesses may decide to pay
licensing fees to these entities to avoid greater costs. See PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S.
INNOVATION, supra note

17.
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Distractionsto Management andEngineers

Numerous companies and venture capitalists spoke about the major
distractions to management and other employees of the company, including
time spent by engineers. One company noted pointedly that about 40% of
the chief technical officer's time was redirected to fighting two patent
infringement lawsuits filed within three weeks of each other. Another
company explained that patent demands had absorbed hundreds of hours of
the CEO's time and another simply noted that it was a "huge distraction."
Many companies described loss of management time to respond to
discovery questions and develop a response strategy, and loss of
engineering time to make technical workarounds. Over and over again, the
companies and the venture capitalists talked about distraction of time and
wasted resources.
3.

Cost Impact

Other companies and venture capitalists underscored the impact of
specific costs and the way in which patent demands now add to the general
costs of doing business. 92 For example, one venture capitalist noted that,
"[m]ost of portfolio companies now need to hire an in-house general
counsel to manage intellectual property matters, including defense against
infringement claims. This is becoming a strategically important position to
fill."
In asking the companies and venture capitalists to estimate the cost
of defending against patent demands, the survey had listed "over $100,000"
as the highest number. In the comments section, however, a number of the
companies and venture capitalists described costs running into the millions
of dollars. In the highest number cited, one startup company explained that
it has spent $4 million in litigation expenses. A number of others simply
referred to costs in the millions of dollars. One company reported that the
cost of dealing with patent demands is the company's second biggest
expense after salary, and that it is even larger than the cost of benefits.
Others reported diverting money to legal counsel, as well as huge amounts
of time spent by management and by the board. As one company noted, "we
have had to invest time researching the background of the plaintiffs, the
patent, the claim . . . etc. internally to determine how to defend ourselves
The present survey did not ask the portfolio companies themselves or the venture
capitalists sitting on their boards about the financial scale of the portfolio companies at the
time these patent demands were made. Therefore, this study contains no specific analysis
of the ratio of patent demand costs to the general costs of doing business.
92
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from patent demands. . . . We expect to expend more resources as we
engage counsel to defend ourselves from the suit. We are still at initial
stages for our first lawsuit against an NPE."
4.

The Human Face

Some companies and venture capitalists described the sheer human
toll on those who had to contend with patent assertions.
We received a [cease and desist demand] from a patent troll
on Christmas Eve 2011. The experience was new to us, and
at the time, it seemed like an existential threat. It ruined my
family's Christmas. The troll filed a lawsuit in the spring of
2012. The entire process lasted almost a year and completely
distracted our company during the entire event. It took a
huge emotional and financial toll on our small company, in
addition to slowing down our progress.
One startup company used the following terms to describe the
impact on the company: "Abject fear we are being driven out of business so
this troll can put a trophy on his wall." In a similar vein, one venture
capitalist spoke about the damage to employee morale. Another company
commented, "I consider this process to be extortion."
These comments echoed the narratives Professor Colleen Chien has
reported in her interviews with a group of small technology companies that
had received patent demands from non-practicing entities. 93 Two of the
most poignant comments from Professor Chien's research are the following:
It was agonizing to hand over all the money we had earned
from a product we had invented and created ourselves to a
firm that invents nothing and creates nothing.94 Our founder
has since lost his house, car [sic] all his assets.
And:
They sued my startup for infringement on a group of
insanely broad software patents. While many much larger
companies are fighting we do not have the resources to do
so. It is the single most frustrating experiences [sic] I've had
professionally. Extortion, pure and simple. The troll even
93 See Chien, Startups and PatentTrolls, supra note 10, at 12-14.
94

Id at 14.
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admitted his model was to sue everyone, get settlement
dollars because fighting was too expensive. 95
5.

Other Assorted Impacts

Other companies and venture capitalists described the difficulties of
managing the issue with customers, prospects and funders. One company
noted that it had to "sell around the story as new prospects were wary of
using the product given the litigation," and a venture capitalist talked about
the problem of slowing down sales "as prospective customers assess the risk
of claims on the likelihood that the product and support will be available."
Another venture capitalist talked about the impact of slowing down next
rounds of fundraising. These can be critical issues for a fledgling company,
when every funding prospect and every customer matters in trying to gain
traction.
A small number of respondents noted more moderate impacts, such
as "slightly reorganized business to reflect patent" and "moderate $ spent
externally on legal counsel." One company noted that so far, they have been
able to successfully demonstrate they are not party to any of the claims. In
addition, one venture capitalist noted that the impact can be "highly
variable."
6.

Weak Claims; Wasteful Process

Many respondents expressed frustration at what they perceive to be
the weaknesses of the claims, the wastefulness of the process, and the
absurdity of the current process of patent demands as a whole. For example,
one company described the following experience:
We spent millions to settle pretty much completely spurious
claims. The common approach that these "entities" took was:
--make a claim--try to defend it as best they could-eventually offer to settle by observing that it would cost us
$3-5 million to fight it and we might lose, vs. the $2-3
million they offer to settle initially . . . we'd work to
negotiate them down to $1-2 million, hold our nose, and pay.
Another noted that the patent asserted against the company was
"broad reaching and has been poorly received [in the industry]." Yet
another company reported that after spending $1 million on a case that went
95 id.
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to litigation, the company won but did not recover anything more than court
costs, which are typically a small amount. Numerous companies and
venture capitalists described the claims as frivolous and no more than
nuisance claims.
One venture capitalist took the time to write a side letter with an
extensive allegory of "lawn trolls." The lawn trolls arrive in a community
and convince all of the neighbors to negotiate over nothing more than the
right to enjoy the view of each other's lawns. At the end of the story, the
neighborhood has suffered costly and distracting negotiations and incurred
significant transaction costs, while "the troll gets rich for its foresight,
wisdom, and creation of the market. The moral of the story, according to the
venture capitalist, is that lawn trolls do not want fair compensation; what
they really want is to tax everyone.
Finally, to paraphrase one venture capitalist who summed up the
impact of patent demands on venture-backed companies in a particularly
cogent fashion: When companies spend money protecting their intellectual
property position, they are not expanding; and when companies
spend time
96
inventing.
not
are
they
demands,
thinking about patent
E. Is Patent Assertion Helpful or Harmful for the VentureBacked Community?
A key goal of the study was to test the venture-backed community's
own views of whether patent assertion in their field is helpful or harmful.
Some have suggested that patent assertion is helpful for startups and venture
capitalists because unsuccessful companies can sell their patents to a
monetizer if the company fails. In particular, in listing potential positive
aspects of patent assertion entities, government officials have suggested that
patent assertion entities, "can make it easier for a failed start-up to monetize
its patents, providing some insurance for venture capitalists., 97 These
arguments imply that monetization could spur venture capital investment,
providing a benefit for the startup community.

96 The venture capitalist's direct quotation from the study comments is: "More spend [sic]

to protect IP position, not necessarily expand. Thinking about trolls asserting not about
inventing."

97 See Ramirez, supra note 20. In Chien's work, only 5% of startup companies responded

that they have monetized their patents, with some of those explaining that they had either
sold the patents along with a product line, sold unused patents, or licensed their patents.
See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 10, at 18. Chien points out that many

startups do not bother to obtain patents, particularly in the software industry, and notes, in
addition, that companies may be embarrassed to acknowledge monetizing patents. Id.
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The study tested whether the venture-backed community itself sees
patent demands as a positive. The study also examined how patent demands
factors into venture capitalists' decisions of whether to invest in a particular
startup company. Respondents who had answered at the start of the survey
that they had not received patent demands were routed directly to this last
set of questions.
Specifically, the survey asked venture capitalists, "how much of a
problem are patent demands against venture-backed portfolio companies."
Only 6% responded that patent demands are not much of a problem at all
for venture-backed companies. 920% of the venture capitalists responded
that patent demands are a problem for venture-backed companies, with
460% considering patent demands a widespread problem and 460%

consideringpatent demands a limitedproblem.
IHo1
much of a problem are patent demands against ieniture backed
portfolio Companies? (venture capitalists)
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Interestingly, portfolio companies believe even more strongly that
patent demands are a widespread problem. Using a variant of the venture
capitalist question, portfolio companies were asked, "how much of a
problem are patent demands against companies in your industry sector."
64% of portfolio companies responded that patent demands are a
widespread problem in their sector, with another 20% responding that
patent demands are a limited problem. Only 9% of portfolio companies
responded that patent demands are not much of a problem at all.
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How much of a problem are patent demands against
companies in your industry sector? (startup cmnpanies)
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Perhaps one of the most telling set of responses, however, came
from asking the venture capitalists how patent demands play into their
funding decisions. 650% of the venture capitalists disagreed with the
statement, "[als a venture capitalist, in making funding decisions, I
consider the potentialfor selling patents to patent assertion entities if the
companies fail." Only 18% agreed. The largest group of responses came
from those who not only disagreed, but disagreed strongly-constituting
41% of respondents.
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As a venture capitalist, in making funding decisions, I consider
the potential for selling the patents to patent assertion entities
if the companies fail.

* 65%: Disagree
*18%: Agree
17%: Neither Agree nor Di_;ge

Similarly, when the venture capitalists were asked whether they see
"patentassertion as positive for startups and the startup community, " 7200
either disagreed or disagreed strongly. Again, the largest group of
responses came from those who disagreed strongly-constituting 50% in
this case.
As a venture capitalist, I see patent assertion as positive for
startups and the startup Community.

0
*

72%: Disagree
15%: Agree
13%: Neither Agree nortDisagrce
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These results are consistent with comments I heard from venture
capitalists as I was designing the survey. As one venture capitalist noted,
"VCs swing for the fences; they are not interested in pennies on the dollar."
The results are also consistent with Chien's findings in her
interviews of venture capitalists. 78% of the venture capitalists disagreed
that the ability of companies to monetize their patents through
"NPEs/'Trolls"' helped innovation; 83% agreed that NPEs/Trolls are
hurting innovation.9 8
The most striking results, however, came in response to the question
of whether the venture capitalists would "refrain from investing in a new
company that had an existing patent demand." Not a single respondent
chose the answer, "no, it is not a factor." Rather, 1000% of venture
capitalists indicated that if a company had an existing patent demand
against it, it could potentially be a deterrent in deciding whether to invest.
Roughly half indicated that it would be a major deterrent on its face, and the
other half indicated that they might refrain from investing, depending on the
circumstances.
Percentage ofventure capitalists who would refrain from
investing in a newi company that had an existing patent
demand

0% ab J.o

In short, the venture-backed company community overwhelmingly
views patent demands as a negative for their industry, does not think about
the potential for reselling patents when deciding whether to invest in a
98 See Chien, Startups and PatentTrolls, supra note 10, at 2 1.
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company, and would pause before investing in a company that had an
existing patent demand against it. Thus, the notion that patent assertion is
helpful for the venture capital community is contradicted by the community
itself in this study.
III.

CONCLUSION

The results of surveying 200 venture capitalists and their portfolio
companies provide strong indications of the impact that patent demands are
having on the venture-backed community. Both the companies and the
venture capitalists overwhelming believe that patent demands have a
negative impact on the venture-backed community, with all or most of those
assertions coming from entities whose core activity involves licensing or
litigating patents. These impacts are described in terms of the specific costs
expended by the companies and by the distraction to management,
engineers, and other employees. Most important, participants described the
human toll that patent demands have had on entrepreneurs. In addition,
when making funding decisions, the vast majority of venture capitalists do
not consider the potential for selling to assertion entities if the company
fails. On the flip side, 100% of venture capitalists indicated that if a
company had an existing patent demand against it, it could be a deterrent in
deciding whether to invest.
Finally, one venture capitalist provided an excellent summary of the
impact of patent demands on venture-backed companies. When companies
spend money trying to protect their intellectual property position, they are
not expanding; and when companies spend time thinking about patent
demands, they are not inventing.
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I

Alaama

1"o

2

Alaska

0%

3

Arizona

000

4

Arkansas

0%

5

California
(No.)

3000

6

2%

7

California
(So.)
Colorado

8

Connecticut

0%

9

Delaware

300

10

District of

0%

700

Columbia
11

Florida

000

12

Georgia

0%

13

Hawaii

100

14

Idaho

100

15

Illinois

1300

16

Indiana

0%

17

Iowa

10o

18

Kansas

0%

19

Kentucky

000
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20

Louisiana

21

Maine

22

Maryland

3%

23

Massachusetts

1100

24

Michigan

1%

25

Minnesota

100

26

Mississippi

0%

27

Missouri

000

28

Montana

0%

29

Nebraska

000

30

Nevada

0%

31

00/0

32

New
Hampshire
New Jersey

33

New Mexico

000

34

New York

7%

35

100

36

North
Carolina
North Dakota

0%

37

Ohio

0010

38

Oklahoma

0%

39

Oregon

100

40

Pennsylvania

1%

0%
0010

100
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41

Rhode Island

000

42

South

0%

Carolina
43

South Dakota

000

44

Tennessee

0%

45

Texas

700

46

Utah

0%

47

Vermont

000

48

Virginia

20

49

Washington

20

50

West Virginia

0%

51

Wisconsin

400

52

Wyoming

0%

Total

15

10000

